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Compensating Wage Differentials and the Duration of Wage Loss
ABSTRACT
Several reasons are offered why workers will receive larger
compensating wage differentials for increases in the duration of wage losses
than for increases in the probability of loss that produce the same expected
loss. A formal model of occupational choice is developed that shows the
extent to which the compensation for increased duration exceeds that for
increased risk.
Using Panel Study of Income Dynamics data linked to industry data on
injuries and unemployment, we find:1) Nearly all the compensating wage
differential for losses due to workplace injuries is compensation for
increases in the duration of loss; 2) Similarly, nearly all the compensation
for losses due to cyclical unemployment is compensation for increases in
duration, especially for increases in duration beyond the 26 weeks of
unemployment that are usually compensated by unemployment insurance. The
compensating differentials for risk of injury are larger for union than for
nonunion workers, while those for cyclical unemployment are smaller for union
workers.
Daniel S. Hamermesh John R. Wolfe
Department of Economics Department of Economics
Michigan State University Michigan State University
East Lansing, MI 48824 East Lansing, MI 48824
(517) 355—5238 (517) 355-1863The concept of compensating wage differentials has been a
hardy device •for generating fruitful hypotheses about wage
structure. Clearly3 not all hypotheses growing out of the
concept will be supported by the evidence, nor will all c-f them
apply at all places and at all times. Rees (1975)
I. Introduction
A substantial and rapidly growing body of research has examined the
relationship between wage levels and the likelihood of wage loss. With its
roots in Adam Smith, (1937Book1, Chapter 18), this literature has studied
the effect of the risk of work—related fatal accidents (Thaler—Rosen, 1975;
Srr,ith, 1979); work—related nonfatal accidents <Viscusi, 1979; Olson, 1981);
and the risk of unemployment (Abowd—Ashen-felter, 1981; Topel, 1984; Li, 1986).
The entire genre of research examines how wages among otherwise identical
individuals differ as their expected wage losses vary.
Though the literature clearly stems from Adam Smith, the 0hardy device0
in the Wealth of Nations has not, we believe, been fully exploited to generate
all the 0fruitful hypotheses0 in this area that it might. An>' expected wage
loss is made up of two components: The incidence of the loss——the probability
that the loss will occur; and the duration of loss conditional on its
occurrence. Two otherwise identical workers can face the same expected loss,
yet face sharply differing incidence and duration of loss. For several
reasons we should not expect these two workers to receive identical
compensating differentials for' the same expected loss. A worker's preferences
wifl not be symmetric in frequency and duration, unless the worker is risk
neutral: A doubling of duration will provide greater disutility to a
risk—averse worker than will a doubling of -frequency, because such a changei1l broaden the distribution of possible Wage losses.nso-far as borrowing
to 4 narceconsurupt or isdi If iCUItandthe workersill qud, this
differencewiflbeespecially pronounced. Similarly, as Hurd(1980)and
Layard <1982: argue, upward—sloping labor supply curies guarantee that the
expected utility loss arising from enforced leisure of a given expected length
is greater ifthelossis along—duration, low—probability event than if it is
a brief, high—probability occurrence.
The strongest indication in the empirical literature onwaQelosses that
duration plays an especially important role is the evidence that compensation
for risk of death ismuchgreater than that for finite losses (Smith, 1979).
Such a strong aversion to the risk of death is the limiting case of the
phenomenon that we propose: An aversion to the risk of large losses, holding
the expected loss constant.1
In this study we develop a model that derives the effects cf variations
in the incidence and duration of wage loss on workers expected lifetime
utilities. The relationships implxalocusolequilibriumcombinationsof
wages and expected wage losses that depends on the duration of loss
conditional upon a loss occurrirg. The model is then compared to the standard
model that ignores the distinction between incidence and duration and also to
less structured estimating equations. Data from the Panel Study of Income
Dynamicsare used along with published data by industry on the incidence and
duration Of various types of loss. Our purpose is not tosuggest that one
particular mechanism produces unequal wage responses to incidence and duration
of loss; rather, it is to suggest one such model, then to examine whetherin
fact the responses are unequal
II. The importance ofDuration
The expected duration of wage loss from an event of given severity is the
—j;,.-.product of the duration of wage loss and the frequency c-f the event. Let jobs
vary according to the risk of wage loss, pararneterized as follows: Let the
per—period probability of a loss occurring be P, and the duration of the wage
loss be V periods. Assume also that the wage w is a differentiable -function c-f
fr and )',andthat wages ar-c replaced in proportion (1—a) by social insurance
during periods o-f wage loss. Let the worker's career be c-f fixed length T.
Given V -for a job choice, we can redefine the career to consist of T/Y periods
of length V; during each such period the probability o-f wage loss is PY. For
each period t, define a random variable L(t) such that:
0 if no wage loss occurs
(1) L(t) =
1otherwise
L(t) is binornially distributed, with mean PV and variance PV(1—Pfl.
Suppose that workers are risk averse with respect to lifetime
consumption. In particular, assume the following utility function:
T—_1-
1 c(t)
(2) U(c1, c2,...., CT)=i=t1L1—P]1
whereP is the rate of time preference and is. the degree of relative risk
aversion. We avoid the unnecessary complications o-f borrowing and lending by
assuming a constant marginal rate c-f substitution across periods and a rate c-f
time preference that is equal to the interest rate. A simple consumption plan
in which each period's consumption equals current income then maximizes
utility, since the worker is indifferent between all consumption plans that
exhaust lifetime income. We are thus free to -focus on workers' choices with
respect to the distribution c-f possible discounted lifetime incomes.
Given these assumptions, each period's consumption is:
—3—(3) c(t)= y[z[1—L(t)]+[1—a.]wL(t)]
=
Thedistribution of c(t) istherefore:
(4) c(t) B(yw[1—ay], i2w2c2i[1—])
Theworker's problem is then to maximizeexpectedlifetime utility by choosing
job characteristics P and I' which in turn determine the wage and the
probabil ityofwage loss.
If we assume the L<t) are independently and identically distributed then
meanandvariance of 1 ifetini rnption are easily determined. For
convenience, define the asymptotically normal variable:
(5) c(t)
n(iw[1y1
t1(1p) t=1 El+p]t=i [1÷J2t
For P small and Tn' large, the mean and variance can be approximated by:
(6) C (W[1$Y}1w2a28i[1—iJ) p
Note that mean lifetime consumption is symmetric in P and ),butthat the
variance of C is not: Potential losses of longer duration make lifetime income
and consumption more uncertain, even if frequency is lowered by an equal
propor t ion.
Each worker chooses among Job characteristics .and)'inorder to
maxirni ze:
(7) E(U(C)) = f(C)dC,
subjectto (6), where f isthe density of C. The term C'/[1—] can be















which increases with the mean of lifetime consumption but decreas.es with its
variance 02
SubstitutinQ forand weobtain:
—wE1—ci']1—6 1 6[1—61 '[1—y] (10, E(U) [ IT—E' —______ _____________
p 2[1—cy]
Note that substitution for in the final term renders expected utility
asymmetric in P and Y. aximizing E(U) with respect to P and V is equivalent
to maximizing:
(11) ln(1—6)E(IJ) =[1—61[mw +1n[1—c']—inpI
+1n(1-()[6[1]{pc2i2][l[1+y +[]2÷]2)
14 we assume PY to be small, ignore second— and higher—order terms in P), and
approximate ln(1+x] by x for small values of x, we can write (11) as:
(12) ln(1—6)E(U) =[1—6][1nw—i—1np]—.. 6[1—6Jpa2fy2




Equations (13) and (14) describe the point chosen by the workerfromthe
available frontier w(P,r)ofjob opportunities.2 The following function, which
satisfies both (13) and (14), therefore describes the wage frontier in the
neighborhood of any chosen job:
(15) mw =mw÷ +
wherew is the worker's wage IIIanoccupation in which =V=O.3 Wages should
be a log—linear function of Y, the expected fraction of earnings lost and
not replaced, and of a risk—aversion term in which duration plays a more
important role than does incidence.
A simplified graphical exposition can illustrate the main points of our
argument. Following Abowd—Ashenifelter' (1981), let V(W) be the indirect
util it>' of wage W per period. Arbitrarily assume that P=1 and )=).Theni-f
thefull—time per—period wage is 14*, the per—period indirect utility is
V(W*(1—3),pointB in Figure 1. Assume there is another industry such that
and fr=1/2, so that the expected wage loss remains constant across the two
industries at ?w*. Then the indirect util ity in the second case is at point
in Figure 1. To attract workers to this second industry a wage sufficiently
higher than 14* must be paid. The required wage is W**>W*, such that the
expected indirect utility, the average of the indirect utilities obtained when
no loss is incurred and when the loss is of duration 2), is equal to that
—6-v(W)
Figure 1.
The Neel For Extra Canpensation For t)ura tiori of Loss








wattained vitha waqe ofUJ*and a certain loss of shorter duration, Y'.
Attemptsto estimate the ccirriperssatirigdifferentialdue to possible wage
loss typically are of the same form as (15), less the final term. By forcing
nciderice arid duration to have symmetric effects, this specification subjects
the perceived costs of wage loss to measurement error, and results in a
tendency to underestimate the effect of these perceived costs on wages.
III. An Application to Occupational Injuries
In this sect icr, we apply the model to data on the incidence and duration
of workplace injuries. One study——Dorsey (1983)——did include measures of both
the frequency and severity of injury in equations "explaining"wage
differentials, but gave no reason for doing so and paid no attention to their
separate effects. This particular application is thus the first test of the
notion that risk and duration of loss will produce unequal compensating wage
differentials for workplace injuries.
Equation (15) must be modified for estimation. An empirical version of




whereDUR is the duration of loss; LW=DUR•INC is the expected loss, the
product of incidence and duration; X is a vector o-f other variables, and E is
a disturbance term. The difficulty with this estimating equation is that it
specifies the separate effects of duration and incidence quite restrictively.
Accordingly, we also estimate:
(17) mW =a1'[1nDUR +u2'lnINCj+X+c
Equations(16) and (17) are estimated by ordinary least squares. The
data on which the estimation is based describe heads ofhouseholds in the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics who were between the ages of 22 and 65 in 1981.
—7-This set of data provides no information on workers' assessments of risks on
the job. Instead, we link the PSID data to published injury data, with the
link based or; industry affiliation in 1981, since that is the only year for
which detailed industry data are provided.4 The equations are estimated
separately for 1980 and 1981.
The three—digit code identifying the industry to which the worker's
employer belonged was used to link the record for the worker to Bureau of
Labor Statistics data on workplace injuries.5 While the correspondence between
the two codes was not perfect, departures from a perfect match disqualified
relatively few observations. This problem and the lack of complete
information on all the variables required for the vector X resulted in a
sample of 1689 household heads for 1981, and 1497 for 1980. Insofar as workers
report their industry affil iation incorrectly, estimates of the compensating
differentials will be biased toward zero, with a bias that Mellow—Sider (1983)
show can be fairly large.6
The means of the BLS injury data in this sample of individuals are shown
in Table 1. The figures on incidence and expected days lost (LW) are per 100
worker—years. The incidence data imply that roughly five percent of the
workforce experiences at least one da>' oflostworktime each year due to
injury on the job. The duration figures can be interpreted as days lost per
nonfatal injury that results in any loss of worktime of one day or more. s
the data make clear, most of the variation in expected days lost across
industries results fromdifferencesin the incidence of injury: Incidence and
duration have similar variances, even though duration has a much higher mean.
Nonetheless, there is substantial variation in the duration of injuries among
industries,and thus substantial room for that variation to allow us to test
the hypotheses we have discussed.7 Incidence and duration are also far from
-8-Table 1














./ Standarddeviations of the means in parentheses here and in Table 6.perfectly correlated: Amongtheobservations for 1980 the correlation is cirily
+.30; for 1981 the correlation is only 4.32.
The wage measure used in the various specifications is the hourly wage
rate on the worker's main job. For salaried workers the PSID bases this
measure on the worker's salary divided by some standard working hours. The
vector X in (16) and (17) is specified to include a number of measures that
have become quite standard in the literature. Thus linear and quadratic terms
in total full—time experience since age 18, and in years of tenure with the
employer, are included in the equation1 as are years of schooling completed.
Demographic variables——race, sex, and marital status——are also included, as
are indicators of the worker's union rneffibership, region (South) arid city
size. Also included are weeks worked and hours worked per week in the
previous year (1979 or 1980), measures designed to control for the different
average rates of pay produced by overtime premia, lower wage rates for
part—time workers, etc. Finally, in some of the estimate; dummy variables for
five major industries——durable manufacturing, nondurable manjfacturing,
agriculture and mining, transportation, communications and public utilities,
and wholesale and retail trade——are also included.8
Table 2 presents the parameter estimates for the sample observed in 1980,
and Table 3 shows the estimates for 1981. In each table the results are
presented without and with the inclusion of the vector of one—digit industry
dummy variables. The results of estimating (16) with c2O, and <17) with
c=1, are quite consistent with those produced by a number of earlier
studies. Since some control for industry differences not attributable to
differences in injury rates is probably desirable, most of the remaining
discussion refers to parameters estimated in the presence of the industry
dummy variables. Even when industry is controlled, though, there is a
—9-Table 2





(16) .001199 0 .5181
(7.31)
(16) .000906 .000014 .5179
(1.94) (.67)
(17) .0858 1 .5188
(7.45)
(17) .3486 .1368 .5315
(8.21) (3.72)
Industry Dummies
(16) .000648 0 .5599
(3.70)
(16) —.000062 .000033 .5604
(—.13) (1.64)
(17) .0479 1 .5594
(3.48)
(17) .3166 .0564 .5714
(7.26) (1.25)
_/t—statisttcsIn parentheses here arid in Tables 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9.
Estimating equations also include education, linear and nonlinear terms in
experience aridtenure,region, marital status, weeks and hours in 1979, sex,
race, union status, city size,andthree occupation dummies.Table 3





(16) .000821 0 .4980
(4.35)
(16) .000244 .000028 .4981
(.50) (1.25)
(17) .0485 1 .4970
(4.49)
(17) .2860 .0384 .5058
(6.50) (.87)
Industry Dummies
(16) .000268 0 .5337
(1.45)
(16) —.000504 .000037 .5342
(—1.02) (1.68)
(17) .0135 1 .5333
(1.04)
(17) .2569 —.0568 .5414
(5.55) (—1.05)
../Estimatingequations also include education, linear and nonlinear terms in
experience and tenure, region, maritalstatus,weeks and hours in 1980, sex,
race, union status, city size, and three occupation dummies.noticeable positive effectofincreased expected lost workdays on varates.
The estimates o-f (16) in which isfr-ce to varydonot Qive very
satistactory results. The increase in theR2is very smallandneither
coefficient is significant at conventional levels whentheindustry dummy
variables are included. Apparently the collinearity between LW and LW•DUR is
causinQ problems.9 When the less restricted equation (17) is estimated we see
striking evidence that duration and incidence of injuries do not produce the
same compensatinQ waqe differentials. The effect of increased duration, c,
is highly significant and positive in both years; that of increased
incidence, is positive one year, negative the other, and insignificant
in both.10 Reestimates of(16)and (17' on samples of blue— and white—collar
workers separately yield slightly weaker results; but the same qualitative
result, a significantly greater impact of duration than of incidence on wages,
exists in each of these subsamples too.
One might argue tb The conpJ;g differential will be affected by
the extent to which workers are insured against the wage loss by socia1
legislation. Thus while many studies ignore this issue, sorne---Arnould—Nichols
(1983), Butler—Worrall (1983) and Ruser (1985)——include replacement rates
under workers' compensation benefits in equations like those presented in
Tables 2 and 3. Accordingly, the equations were reestimated with various
replacement rates included.11 Adding these measures had no significant effect
on the other parameter estimates. Also, the replacement rates usually did
have the expected negative coefficients, but these were never significantly
negative.12 Our focus on injuriesmay explain the departure of these results
from those of Arnould—Nichots (1983) on workplace fatal ities. Workers'
compensation is not an entitlement proqram; it has lor,qwaiting periods, and
its receipt is uncertain in the case of most injuries)3 Thus itperhaps
10 —should not be surprising that it does not affect the size of cornpensatng
differentials for workplace injuries.
There is some evidence <Duncan—Stafford, 1980) o-falink between
compensating wage differentials forworkplacehazards and the union relative
wage effect. That study indicates that part of the union wage advantage
represents compensation -forexposuretc' risks in the workplace. To examine
whether the obverse is true, as Viscusi (1979) indi.cates, and, in particular,
whether unions have different impacts on the compensating differentials for
incidence and duration of risk, we respecify (17). One respecificatiori, which
constrains the effects of duration and incidence to be equal, replaces the
terms in 1nDUR and lnINC in (17) with:
(18) a3 1nLW +a3
UN 1nLW
where t.i=1 if the worker isaunion member. 14The second especi4ication
allows duration and incidence to have different effects on wages in union and
nonunion employment by respecifyinq (18) as:
(19) cc4 1nDUR +a,UN1nDUR +
cc51nINC +a5'UN1nINC
The results of estimating equations based on the specifications in (18:>
and (19) are shown in Table 4 -for both 1980 and 1981. The estimates of (18)
indicate that, in our linked micro——industry data as in Viscusi's (1979)
estimates based on self—reported risks, unionized workers receive an extra
compensating differential -for risks on the job. This can be interpreted as
showing that the informational effects of unions produce increased
compensation for what would not be as clearly perceived by workers negotiating
individually. The estimates of (19) demonstrate that this compensation is
almost entirely for increases in the incidence of the loss: The interaction
term between union status and duration is very small, while that between union
—11—Table 4
Parameter Estimates, PSID ta, 1980 and 1981, Linked to Injury Data,
With Interaction Terms in Union Membership ./
1980 1981
Equation: (18) (19) (18) (19)
a or a .0693 .3504 .0325 .2935
(6.14) (8.55) (3.06) (6.88)
a 'ora ' .0440 .0152 .0458 .0139







/Thevector of dummy variables for 1—digit industry is included in the
equations, as are the variables listed in the notes to Tables 2 and 3.status and !ncldence is lar-g€. and signficant.Our- findingssuggest that
changesin the incidence of losses are not well perceived by worker-s, while
changes in their duration are; if this is so, then thedifferent impactsof
unionism on these compensating wage differentials are consistent with the view
of unions as organizations that increase workers' awareness of, and rewards
for, poorly perceived, generally applicable risks in the workplace.
Ms another way of examining the differential impacts of incidence and
duration of workplace injuries on wages, we calculate the wage—incidence and
wage—duration elasticities for both samples. These estimates, based on the
unconstrained versions of (16:) and (17) that include one—digit industry dummy
variables presented in Tables 2 and 3, are listed in Table 5. They show very
clearly that the positive effect of injury rates on wages is produced by the
duration of the injury. An increasein therisk of injury, holding duration
constant, produces only a very slight compensating wage differential. An
increase in duration, holding the risk of injury constant, produces a much
larger effect on wages. This is especially true if the elasticities are based
on (17), which allowed the effects to vary more freely and which produced the
higherin both years.
Dc'rsey's (1983) estimates using esabl ishment data show significant
impacts of both the incidence and duration of nonfatal injuries. However,
using his published means and estimated equation describing lnW, we calculate
from hisequation a duration elasticity of.28, and an incidence elasticity of
.11. The similarity of theseelasticities to those based on equaticin (17)is
remarkable given their totally different underlying sources of data and
econometr Ic spec if i cat ion.
Toexamine the importance of the differential effects of incidence and
duration on wages, consider what would happen if the average duration of
-12-Table 5
Elasticities of Wage Rates With Respect to
Duration and Incidence of Injuries
Based on Equation: 1980 1981
lnw/lnDUR (16) .0868 .0503
(17) .3166 .2569
lnw/lnINC (16) .0442 .0049
(17) .0179 —.0146
!.j All the elasticities are based on the estimates ta Tables 2 and 3 in ihich
the v-actor of industry dummies is included.nonfatal injuries dropped by two standard deviations! wiule the mean expected
time lost remained unchanged because of an offsetting increase in incidence.
Using estimates based on (17:) arid on data -from 1980, we calculate that the
average worker would pay 15 percent of the current average wage to obtain a
change in working conditions that would alter outcomes in this manner; using
the 1981 estimates, the wage—equivalent of the utility gain implicit in this
change is 14 percent. Clearly, there are potentially substantial gains in
welfare from reducing the duration of workplace injuries.
IV.AnApplication to Unemployment
There are two distinct strands in the literature on compensating
differentials for the risk of unemployment. One (Hall, 1972; Topel, 1984),
examines how wages differ across high— and low—unemployment industr-ies and
regions at a point in time, and thus presumably measures the extent 0-f
compensating differentials for long—ter-m (structural) differences in
unemployment. The other (Abowd—shenfelter, 1981) examines tow wages differ
across industries and occupations with varying probabilities of cyclical
unemployment. Clearly, the two strands are distinct in terms o-f empirical
specification (though Li, 1986, provides an initial attempt to estimate both
in the same model). In terms of their relation to the underlying theory,
though, no such distinction exists. Both types of differential presumably
arise out of workers' awareness that there are occupational and industrial
differences in the risks of both types of unemployment. That being the case,
our theory suggests that we should observe compensating differentials for both
risks, and that in each case the differential should be greater, given
identical expected iOSSCS, for increases in the duration of loss than for
increases in its incidence.
To examine the hypothesis in this context, we again use data from the
—13—Panel Study of Income Dynamics, in this case only from the 1981 iriterviewinc1
wave. The wage and background data are as in Section III; however, because we
did not require that wage data be available 4cr two consecutive years, and
because the link to unemployment data was possible for all industries, 2625
observations are available for this part of the study.
The unemployment data are based on supplementary questions on work
experience appended to the March Current Population Survey. Because we wish to
examine compensating differences for both structural and cxci ical
unemployment, we use data for both 1979 (a cycl ical peak) and 1982 (a cxci ical
trough), data from the March 1980 and March 1983 CPS. For workers
intervetued in March of the subsequent year, data are provided on the fraction
experiencing some unemployment and on the distribution of weeks of
unemployment among those individuals. Workers' affiliations by two— or
three—digit industry are based on where they worked the longest during the
calendar year (not where they worked at the date of the interview).
Because the duration data are categorical, it was necessary to aggregate
them using some assumptions about their distributions within the categories.16
We assumed that the hazard rate of leaving unemployment was constant within
each category, and that the fraction of workers remaining unemployed at the
er,d of an interval equalled the published fraction remaining unemployed. This
technique produced the data on duration and incidence for 1979 and 1982 and
for the peak—to—trough variation, all of which are presented in Table 6.
There is much greater variation across industries in the incidence of
unemployment than in its duration. This is true in both a peak year, 1979,
and at a business—cycle trough, 1982. Moreover, even though the decomposition
of the cyclical increase in unemployment into cyclical changes in duration and
incidence shows that both increased roughly equally, the variance in the
—14—Table 6
























(.09)cyclical change inincidence acrossindustries was muchQreater than that ii
duration.The greater variationin incidence thaniidurationwas the same
phenomenonthat we observed inworkplacei nijury rates.lso asri those data
thesimple correlations between duration and incidence are not particularly
high:For 1979 and 1982 they are +.32 and +.33 respectively; for the cyclical
changes in duration arid incidence, the simple correiation is only +.15.
A. Unemployment in 1979
The re:':s cf es:atinigvariantsofequatiors(16) and (17) over the
1981 PSID data linked to the 1979 work—experiencedata are presentedin the
first four rows ofTable 7. In this tableand in Table 8 only estimates based
onequations that include the vector of one—digit industry dummy variables are
presented. (The results do not differ qualitatively when this vector is
excluded.) The results are very disappointing. There is a negative and
significant relation between the wage rate and the unernplc'yrnent rate of
experienced workers in the industry (as shown in the constrained versions o-f
equations (16) and (17)). Indeed, as the unconstrained version of (17) shows,
it is differences in the duration of unemployment in 1979 that are most
strongly linked to (lower) wage rates; the effect of incidenceissmaller and
not significant.
Twoexplanations for theseunexpected results were explored. e saw in
Section III that interstate differences in worker's compensation benefits did
not affect compensating differentials paid to workers in different
industries. However, unemployment insurance is a more widespread transfer
than is workes compensation; and more important, it is. a transfer that will
be received with near—certainty should a particular loss occur. Thus, if
interindustry differences in duration arid incidence are correlated with the
—15-Table 7
Parameter Estimates, PSID Data, 1981, Linked to 1979 Unemployment Data
Including One—Digit Industry DummyVariables./





































./ &lsoincluded are the same variables that were included in the regressions
presented in Tables 3 and 4, and in Tables 8 and 9.Qenercsity of state UIprcQrarnsq failuretoinclude sorrie measureof the latter
wHi bias estimates of compensating differentials for the risk of
uriernployrnert. To examine this possibility we linked the state average
potential duration of regular UI benefits to the data on household heads from
the 1981 PSID.
The result o-f adding the potential duration of reQular UI benefits in the
state in which the worker resides to (17:) are shown in the fifth row of Table
7. LJcurkers. in states that offer UI benefits with longer potential duration do
receive lower wages, with each extra week of potential duration reducing wages
by .6 percent. However, inclusion of the UI measure does not qualitatively
affect the estimated impacts of duration and incidence. By inference there is
little correlation across workers between interstate differences in the
generosity of UI and interindustry differences in unemployment duration and
inc i dence.
The second explanation is that inter industry differences in the mean loss
are unimportant, and that workers require compensation only for the risk of a
long—duration loss (since only that loss will not be at least partly
compensated by UI benefits). This view is consistent both with the derivation
in Section II and with the notion that the value of leisure during the first
part of a spell of unemployment is quite high. To examine this possibility we
also added the percentage of experienced workers by industry who were
unemployed more than 26 weeks to the estimating equations.
This addition produced some interesting changes in the results.Looking
at the sixth row of Table 7, one sees that increases in theaverage duration
of unemployment produce the expected positive effect onwages, while greater
incidence still reduces wages (though only sl ightly). However, the largest
effect ts the very significant negative impact of increases in the percentageof icing—term urernployed. The results thus still confound the predictions of
our'simplemodel.
The estimates indicate clearly that longer—duration unemployment,
especially increases in the fraction o-f the unemployed in an industry in the
upper tail of the distribution of spells by length, is associated with lower
wage rates. One explanation for this apparent anomaly is that some
individuals move frequently between employment and nonparticipation, much of
the latter of which is recorded as unemployment1 because they have reservation
wages that are high relative to their market wages. Unless differences in
market wages are associated in the population with even larger differences in
reservation wages, these individuals will tend to be those with below—average
market wages. Thus an industry recording a large amount of long—duration
unemployment may also employ workers who command lower—than—average wages.
The spells of long—duration unemployment in such industries will not be
compensated by wages because they represent leisure that is valued. This view
is supported by inspection in the data we use: The industries having the
largest percentages of long—term unemployed among experienced workers attached
to the industry in 1979 were private household services, welfare and religious
services, and agriculture. The lowest percentages were in automobile
manufacturing, apparel manufacturing, and stone, clay and glass
manufacturing.
B. Cyclical Changes in Unemployment, 1979—82
Equati c'ns (16) and(17) werereest imated using the cycl i cal changes in
<the logarithms) o-ftheduration and incidence of unemployment by industry.
Theresults of this estimation are shown in Table 8. As the first four rows
show, compensating differentials exist for cyclical variations in the
—17-Table 8
Parameter Estimates, PSID Data, 1981, Linked to 1979—82 Unemployment Changes,
Including One—Digit Industry Dummy Variables
Potential





(16) —.0091 0 .5241
(—1 .68)
(16) —.0400 .00694 .5260
(—3.79) (3.42)
(17) .0307 1 .5237
(.91)
(17) .4392 —.1060 .5287
(5.28) (—1.28)
(17) .4376 —.1024 —.0059 .5292
(5.27) (—1.22) (—1.91)
(17) .0098 —7.215 —.0056 .0148 .5312
(.07) (—1.91) (—1.80) (3.49)incidence and duration of unernplo:,ment that are remarkably like those that we
demonstrated jr Section II] exist for workplace injuries.. The estimates of
the unconstrained version of (17) indicate that the compensatinQ dLfferential
is paid only for differences in cyclical changes in duration; cxci ical changes
in incidence have no impact on wage differentials once changes in duration are
18 accounted for.This conclusion is underscored by a comparison of the in
the regressions in the third and four rows.19
As in Section IV.A., we added a measure of the qenerosity of unemplc'yrnent
benefits, the potential duration of benefits, to the equations. Also, the
cyclical change in the percentage of long—term unemployed workers by industry
was added. Examining the fifth row in Table 8, we again find that workers
living in states with a longer average potential duration of UI benefits
receive lower wage rates. The results of including the cyclical change in the
percentage of long—term unemployed are striking. One notes from the last row
in the table that there is no independent impact either of the change in the
average duration or of the change in incidence. Rather, there is a very
significant positive effect of the change in long—term unemployment. The
positive compensating differential that exists for larger cyclical changes in
the duration of unemployment is entirely due to differentials that are paid in
industries where the risk of long—duration unemployment increases most during
recessions. Since it is precisely the cyclical increase in long—duration
unemployment that is not automatically compensated by unemployment insurance,
this result makes sense.
Since we know unions affect cyclical changes in employment (see Medoff,
1979), it is worth examining how they affect the compensating differentials
that we have demonstrated exist for cyclical changes in unemployment
duration. The results of estimating (18) and (19), the versions of (17)
-18-respecif ledtoinclude interactions of union status with expected loss, and
with duration and incidence separately, are shown in Table 9. The most
striking result :s that the interaction term involving InDUR is highly
significant arid negative. Indeed, the estimates of (19) demonstrate that the
large positive effect of greater cyclical changes in unemployment duration on
wages arises solely in nonunion employment; among unionized workers the
effects are rieQativE' and insignificant. (A test of the Joint significance of
and c yielded F(2, 2598) =4.69,significant at the 99 percent level of
confidence.) The results of estimating 19 show that a failure to understand
that workers react more strongly to differences in duration than in incidence
would have prevented one from seeing how unions affect these compensating
differentials: If changes in duration and incidence are constrained to have
the same effect, the interaction term with union status is not significant.
The lack of a compensating wage differential in unionized employment for
differences in the cyclicality of the duration of unemployment is consistent
with several models of union behavior. One standard analysis assumes that
unions seek to maximize the utility of the median member (voter). Assume also
that demand is not so highly variable over the cycle that the worker with the
median amount of seniority will be laid off during a recession. That being
the case, the existence of larger variations in the cyclicality of
unemployment will not affect union bargainers' wage policy, as the median
union member will be unconcerned about such variations.
Table 10 presents estimate; of the elasticity of wage rates with respect
to interindustry differences in cyclical changes in the average duration and
incidence of unemployment. The elasticities are based on the estimates of the
unconstrained versions of equations (16) and (17) (excluding the measures of
potential duration of UI benefits and of long—term unemployment). The
—19—Table 9
Parameter Estimates, PSID Data, 1981, Linked to 1979—82 Unemployment
Changes, withInteractionTerms in Union Iembership
Equation: (18) (19)
a ora, —.0164 .2955
(—.52) (3.88)
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1nw/1nINC —.3529 —.0467elasticities based on (17: are quite similarinnsaQritude to the elasticities
presented in Table 5; they suggest a huge compensatin differential for
chanQes ir duration, with essentially rio corriperisaticir for cyclical changes in
the incidence of unemployment. Using these estimates, we calculate that a
two—standard—deviation decrease inthecyclicality of duration that is
accompanied by an offsetting increase in the cyclical variability of incidence
would induce an 8 percent decrease in waae rates. As with workplace injuries,
there is evidence that there would be substantial welfare gains to reducing
the cycl ical variability of unemployment duration.
V. Conclusions
We have derived a model of compensating differentials for wage losses
which recognizes the importance of risk aversion. The model predicts that
wage differentials will respond more strongly to an increase in the duration
of the wage loss than to a rise in its incidence that produces an equal
increase in the expected loss. This prediction was first verified using two
cross sections of data on individuals' wages and characteristics linked to
aggregate data on the injury experience of the three—digit industries in which
they work. We found that most of the compensating differential for higher
nonfatal workplace injuries stems from the large negative effect of ar
increase in the expected duration of an injury on the wage. The hypothesis
was then examined in the context of compensating differentials for
unemployment, both structural and cyclical. There was no support for it in
cross—section data, perhaps because of unmeasured differences across
industries in reservation wages. However, we found that the compensating wage
differential for differences in the cyclicality of unemployment is mainly a
result of compensation for differences in the cyclical ity of unemployment
duration. Moreover, the elasticities of wage rates withrespect to these
—20 —differences are quite close to those withrespectto differences in the
duration of injuries.
L.4e have also shownthatunion intervention intheprocess that Qenerates
compensating differentials -for wage losses differs by the type of loss. In
the case of losses due to injuries unions raise the compensation for increases
in the expected incidence of the loss and have little impact on compensation
for increased duration. This contrasts to our finding that unionized workers
receive little compensation for the risk of cyci ical unemployment, especially
cyci ical increases in unemployment duration. Upon first glance these results
appear quite contradictory. If one considers the nature of the losses
involved, though, the two sets of results are completely consistent. Unlike
the risk of cyclical unemployment, which is borne in most cases by junior
workers, the risk of injury affects all workers in a plant; there is very
little unions can do to shift the risk away from the median member. Thus we
should expect that unions will bargain for higher wages to compensate the
median member for the risk of injury, while they are less concerned with the
effects cif a higher risk of cycl ical unemployment, especially longer—duration
cyclical unemployment, that do not affect most members.
In a world of complete information and certain receipt of
employer—financed insurance for wage losses there is an equivalence between
the cost of compensating wage differentials to induce workers to accept risks
and the cost of social insurance. That equivalence breaks down if, as our
results indicate, workers2 risk aversion leads them to demand extra
compensation for increases in the duration o-flossbeyond that which
compensates them for the expected loss. The cost of insurance would merely
equal the expected loss, while compensating differentials will vary depending
crithe relative sizes of the two components ofthat expected loss.Ingeneral, then, the rnarqcnal benefit to the employer of greater safety will
depend upon the absence or presence of legal insurance requirements. Our
results therefore indicate that, because o-f the special roles of duration and
risk aversion, welfare depends upon the insurance regime assumed.
While the empirical research on workplace injuries and cyclical
unemployment offers evidence supportinQ our predictions about the importance
of duration of loss in producing compensating wage differentials, it is only
the beginning of research on this issue. Additional work on alternative sets
of data is needed. Also, further work should test the various explanations
for the existence of especially large compensating differentials for the
duration of loss.
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—24—FOOTNOTES
1.Theon]', theoreticaldiscuior; of this issue is in Adams (1985),who only
nate that compensating differentials for unemployment could differ depending
on whether- the increased like] ihood of iciss s due to greater incidence or
longer duration.
2. Multiple tangencies between the wage frontier arid worker' indifference
curves are possible, even if indifference curves are all identical, because
the wage frontier is responsive to market demands for productsrequiring
varying risks of wane loss.
3. If the worker perceives that wages are reduced bya fraction E of the
xpected loss P in order to help to finance wage replacement, and if w
represents the worker's true marginal product, then the second term in (15)
becomes PY[ +3
4. One would also like to test the equations using jobchangers, those for
whom fixed effects can be removed. This would, as Duncan—Hoimlund (1983)
point out, reduce biases in the estimates of compensating differentials,
though the reduction is less in our data than it would be if we used
self—reported risks. Unfortunately, 1981 was the first year the necessary
detail on industry affiliation was given iii the PSID.
5. The data are from BLS, Occupational Injuries and Illnesses in theUnited
States by Industry, 1980, 1981, Bulletins 2130 and 2164.
6. Clearly, since the data cover- industries and the observationsare on
individuals1 there is no simultaneity problem. There is, however, a potential
prc'blem o-ftruncation of theduration data, as only days lost during the
particular year are included in the calculation of DUR for an industry.
Unfortunately, without additional information it is impossible to tell whether
this measurement problem produces different biases on the estimates of the
separate effects of duration and incidence.
7. The ranges of L4 in 1980 and 1981 are from 3.2 to 338.9, and 2.3 to 289.3;
the ranges of INC are from .2 to 14.9, and from .2 to 14.4; those of OUR are
from 9.0 to 35.75, and from 9.0 to 37.57.
8. One could specify a finer breakdown by industry.However, a complete set
of dummies, one for each three—digit industry, would wipe out the coefficients
on the injur-y variables, sincetheseare available only at that level of
disaggreqation. There is thus an inherent problem in this and all other
studies of compensating differentials for risk of workplace injuryor fatality
that use micro data linked to industry or occupation statistics: One cannot
completely distinguish the effects of other industrial or occupational
characteristics that are correlated with the incidence and duration of injury
and that affect wage differentials fromthoseof the injury hazards
themse] yes.
9.'ht is producing the difficulty is suggested by the relative lack of
—25 —variation in DUR that we noted above.
10. While we have used logarithmic forms of DUR and INC here, qualitatively
similar results are produced when linear forms are included in a respecified
versic.ri cit (17).
11. Richard Butler kindl::i provided the data used in his study. For
observations in the 35 states with adequate data1 equations including
replacement rates under workers' compensation were estimated.
12. Our finding of little effect of workers' compensation benefits on the
comperisatinQ differentials parallels that of Ruser (1985). The difference
between our results and those of Butler—Worrall (1983) may stem from their use
of aggregate wage data.
13. Although disturbingly little information is available on actual benefits
paid, as opposed to benefit schedules, the evidence does suggest the haphazard
nature of income replacement. Thus Interdepartmental Workers' Compensation
Task Force, Research Report1 Volume VI, 1981, shows that actual replacement
rates for varying degrees of permanent partial disability ranged from .45 to
1.53 in Wisconsin, and from 1.85 to 13.85 in Florida.
14. Llnion membership rather than collective bargaining coverage is also used
in studies of compensating differentials by Viscusi (1979), Olson (1981) and
Duncan—Stafford (1980).
15.TheMarch 1980 data are unpb shed and were kindly provided to us by Paul
Flairn; the March 1983 data are presented in Table 8—121 BLS, Work Experience
of the Population in 1981—82, Bulletin 2199, 1984.
16. The data are divided into durations o-f 1—4 weeks, 5—10, 11—14, 15—26, and
27 plus. The duration data measure the total weeks of unemployment
experienced during the previous year. Thus an individual with two ten—week
spells would be recorded as having unemployment with a duration of twenty
weeks,. Also, as with the injury data used in Section III, reported spell
duration may be truncated because spells that overlap calendar years are not
fully reported. Without knodng more detail about their distribution, though,
we cannot tell what are the relative biases to the separate estimates of
incidence and duration effects on compensating differentials.
17. The UI data are for 19E:0, the most recent available, and are taken from
Employment and Training Administration, Handbook of UI Financial Data, ET
Handbook 394. Topel (1984) found that adding a measure of the replacement rate
(the weekly benefit relative to the individual's wage) to equations that
shcied no ccimperisating wage differential for unemployment changed those
results drastically and made the differential significant and positive.
However, the replacement measure included the dependent variable in its
denominator. Moreover, since our theory is based on aversion to the risk of a
long—duration loss, a measure of interstate differences in the extent to which
long—duration losses are covered is more appropriate for our purposes.
18. The double recession from 1980—82 was reputed to be especially heavily
concentrated in hiqh-wage industries. If this is true, and if the variables
in the vector X and the vector of one—digit industry dursmy variables do not
account for all other factors, it may be that the peculiarities of that
—26—recession are producing our results. Thus the high—wage industries wou'd be
those in which duration rose the most, not because high waaesrepresent
compensating differentials, but because high wages were associated with and
may even have induced, above-average cyclical increases in unemployment.
Without data from additional recessions this possibil it>' cannot be
distinguished fromour explanation.
19. The result does not depend on our use of logarithmic forms of the measures
of duration and ir,cierece: When linear forms were added the results changed
little (though the R were slightly lower).Similarly,the results differ
little when the sample is restricted to blue—collar workers.
20.Theequations presented inthetable do riot include the measure of
cyclical changes in long—term unemployment.
—27—